Stimulus contrast and duration effects on visual temporal integration and order judgment were examined in a unified paradigm. Stimulus onset asynchrony was governed by the duration of the first stimulus in Experiment 1, and by the interstimulus interval in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, integration and order uncertainty increased when a low contrast stimulus followed a high contrast stimulus, but only when the second stimulus was 20 or 30 ms. At 10 ms duration of the second stimulus, integration and uncertainty decreased. Temporal order judgments at all durations of the second stimulus were better for a low contrast stimulus following a high contrast one. By contrast, in Experiment 2, a low contrast stimulus following a high contrast stimulus consistently produced higher integration rates, order uncertainty, and lower order accuracy. Contrast and duration thus interacted, breaking correspondence between integration and order perception. The results are interpreted in a tentative conceptual framework.
Introduction
Human perceptual awareness has some paradoxical properties. We are able to detect flashes of light that last only 1 ms, but we cannot reliably estimate just how brief that is (Efron, 1967) . It has also long been known that despite our apparent sensitivity, rapid sequences of brief visual stimuli can outpace the visual system relatively easily. This difficulty does not seem to rest with any particular stimulus being too brief to process perceptually, but rather with the speed at which one stimulus is followed by the next. It has long been known that in extremis, at high succession speeds, stimuli are simply perceived as simultaneous (Exner, 1875) . Before that unified state is reached, two presumably related phenomena occur: Confusion arises about which stimulus came first, and also, the identities of individual stimuli may get blended to the extent that they are perceived as parts of a single composite stimulus, which comprises all the features of its multiple constituents.
Evidence for the first phenomenon comes from temporal order judgment (TOJ) tasks, in which observers are presented with two almost simultaneous stimuli, and are asked to decide which of the pair came first: When the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between them falls from approximately 100 to 20 ms, observers drop from near-perfect order judgments to effectively guessing (e.g., Jaśkowski & Verleger, 2000) . The accuracy of order judgments is thought to depend on a central, cognitive function, rather than modality-specific factors, since TOJ tasks involving visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli, all produce similar estimates of the critical interval (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961; Sternberg & Knoll, 1973) . The second phenomenon, the temporal integration of successive stimuli, is typically found in tasks that test the observer's ability to respond to a feature that is only apparent from the combination of two individually shown stimulus displays. One exemplary procedure is the missing element task (MET; Akyürek, Schubö, & Hommel, 2010; Hogben & Di Lollo, 1974) , which presents two brief, successive displays of simple stimuli such as dots or small squares within a regularly spaced grid of 5 by 5 positions, such that the first display contains 12 of these stimuli, and the second display another 12. One position in the grid is thereby left empty, for the observer to find. Trying to mentally compare the two partial displays from memory is not a feasible strategy in this task, but the missing element is easily found if the observer is able to perceptually integrate the two displays. Such temporal integration becomes increasingly difficult as the total display duration increases, particularly beyond 100 ms. Like temporal order judgments, it appears that integration is similar across modalities, suggesting it has a central source also (Saija, Andringa, Bas ßkent, & Akyürek, 2014) .
Intuitively, it seems likely that temporal integration and order judgment are closely related. If two successive stimuli are temporally integrated, and perceived as a unitary event, surely a temporal order can no longer be assigned between them. Vice versa, if the stimuli appear to occur so close together in time that their order can only be guessed at, that would suggest a degree of simultaneity that would be associated with integration. The timing of the stimuli obviously strongly governs both the ability to assign order and the tendency to integrate. However, although a strong correlation between integration and order perception may indeed exist (for a demonstration in a rapid serial visual presentation [RSVP] task, see , it may not always be perfect.
In the MET, observers often report a sense of having seen multiple stimuli (i.e., they detected a temporal gap), which implies a minimal awareness of some order, even if the stimuli still appeared to 'fall in line', and integration succeeded. When Kinnucan and Friden (1981) measured MET performance (% correct localization) with stimuli of varying brightness, and subsequently asked observers to rate the degree to which the successive MET displays appeared as one, the outcomes differed as a function of their brightness manipulation. The authors suggested that actual temporal integration and the subjective appearance of unity may rely on different mechanisms, and the latter on discontinuity detection in particular-a function that is presumably central also to temporal order judgments.
Further hints for a possible dissociation between integration and TOJ may be found in studies of stimulus intensity effects in integration tasks. Many studies report inverse intensity effects, that is, integration is found to be enhanced by less intense stimuli (e.g., Bowling & Lovegrove, 1981; Di Lollo & Bischof, 1995) . A similar phenomenon of ''inverse effectiveness" has also been found in multisensory integration tasks, where less salient stimuli are more easily integrated between modalities (Meredith & Stein, 1983) . In TOJ tasks it has also been found that higher stimulus intensity facilitates temporal separation (Jaśkowski & Verleger, 2000) , which reflects the same dynamics. Yet, there have been reports of an opposite relationship as well, in which higher stimulus intensity impedes separation (e.g., Ueno, 1983; Wilson, 1983) . A complicating factor in the interpretation of many of these collective studies is the possible role of retinal afterimages, elicited by using bright stimuli on a dark background. Nonetheless, one account for the discrepant effectiveness that has been offered is that task characteristics vary, namely whether observers are (implicitly) asked to judge stimulus offset or total duration (Nisly & Wasserman, 1989; Wasserman & Nisly-Nagele, 2001 , although see also Di Lollo & Bischof, 1995) . It is conceivable that such characteristics may similarly underlie possible differences between integration (in the MET) and TOJ tasks. In line with this notion, Jaśkowski (1996) has argued that because stimulus intensity effects found on visible persistence are not necessarily mirrored in TOJ performance, TOJ may not strongly rely on perceived duration.
When the strength of the first and second display is independently manipulated, such that a brighter stimulus follows a dimmer stimulus, or vice versa, the outcomes are even less uniform. In a TOJ task, Bachmann, Põder, and Luiga (2004) found that when the relative contrast of a pair of stimuli was manipulated, observers tended to report the stimulus with the lowest contrast as the first. Performance was thus best when the first stimulus was dim, which does not point to inverse effectiveness. Inverse effectiveness would predict higher perceptual latency and more integration with the second stimulus, and thus lower TOJ performance. In line with these findings, however, are reports by Kinnucan and Friden (1981; Experiment 1) and Johnson, Nozama, and Bourassa (1998) , who found increased integration when the first stimulus was stronger than the second in a MET paradigm, again suggesting direct rather than inverse effectiveness. Johnson and colleagues nonetheless also showed that inverse effectiveness was again obtained when the two displays were matched in luminance. In a similar vein, Long and O'Saben (1989) also observed inconsistent intensity effects on integration.
Finally, it is conceivable that temporal integration and temporal order judgments are differentially affected by the deployment of exogenous (stimulus-driven) and endogenous (volitional) modes of attention.
1 Exogenous attention is engaged by stimulus-related manipulations, such as intensity, while endogenous attention responds to (learned) contingencies, such as predictable stimulus timing. Lawrence and Klein (2013) recently demonstrated that exogenous and endogenous factors can have different, dissociable effects on performance (reaction time and accuracy) in temporal attention tasks. Exogenous and endogenous factors are typically not explicitly controlled for in temporal integration and order tasks, but it is conceivable that they are differentially involved in these two tasks, which might lead to different response profiles. Summarizing, even though conceptually temporal integration and order judgment would appear to be two sides of the same coin in perceptual awareness, the collective body of studies on these phenomena shows relatively little consistency. The relationship between temporal integration and order judgment thereby remains underspecified. A closer examination of the correspondence between these measures of rapid visual perception seems called for, and to do so was the aim of the present study. To thus investigate whether temporal integration and order judgments are similarly affected by relative stimulus strength, the present study measured both integration performance and the accuracy, as well as the associated uncertainty of order judgments by means of a single, uniform task, in which stimulus contrast and duration were varied systematically.
The inclusion of a measure of uncertainty in the TOJ task was motivated by a previous study by Ulrich (1987) , who demonstrated that perceptual moment and triggered moment models do not account well for TOJ performance in a classic ternary task, in which the third response option is that of indicating simultaneity. Since the idea of a perceptual moment, whether it is externally triggered or not, is conceptually close to an interval during which temporal integration takes place, this may be taken as evidence for a dissociation between integration and order judgments. However, indicating simultaneity corresponds to a rather specific percept, while it is conceivable that within a particular range of SOA close to actual simultaneity, the perception of simultaneity is not elicited (e.g., because flicker is detected), but order still remains ambiguous. In other words, in this range there may be an interval during which a gap is detected, that is, some implicit order is recognized, but it may yet be impossible to determine what the order actually was. Temporal integration might still occur in this SOA range. To examine whether such impressions are indeed experienced, and whether these might correlate with integration frequency, observers were presently given the option to indicate uncertainty with regard to order.
Finally, in the present study stimulus strength was not manipulated directly as a function of brightness or luminance, but by means of relative contrast, which entailed that when the first stimulus was high contrast, the second stimulus was low contrast, and vice versa. Individual stimulus contrast was furthermore defined such that high contrast corresponded to lower stimulus luminance (and vice versa), which made the stimulus contrast more strongly with the white background, thereby removing possible low-level confounds related to stimulus intensity, such as retinal afterimages, which can vary for both visual latency and persistence measures (Allik & Kreegipuu, 1998; Coltheart, 1980) .
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined the effect of stimulus contrast on temporal integration performance and the accuracy of temporal order judgments under task conditions commonly used in MET paradigms. To this end, an MET based on an existing paradigm (Akyürek et al., 2010) , was designed to include two different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) that were determined by the duration of the first stimulus display (cf. Di Lollo, 1977 . These were furthermore crossed with two different contrast conditions. Either the first or the second stimulus display had higher contrast, while the other display had lower contrast. Finally, the duration of the second stimulus display was varied as well. Next to accuracy measures in both tasks, the frequency of uncertain responses in the ternary temporal order judgment task was also measured.
Method

Participants
Twenty-one Psychology students (19 female) at the University of Groningen participated in the experiment. They could earn a small monetary compensation in exchange for good task performance (detailed below), and were informed about this opportunity beforehand. The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the departmental ethical committee prior to its execution. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and gave written informed consent. The data of two female participants were excluded, because their overall task performance did not meet a minimum level of 10% correct in either task. In the final sample, mean age was 20 years (range 18-25 years).
Apparatus and stimuli
Participants were seated individually in sound-dampened testing cabins, at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm (not fixed) to the screen. Cabin lighting was dimmed. Stimuli were shown on a 22 00 CRT screen, refreshing at 100 Hz, using a display resolution of 800 by 600 pixels and a color depth of 16 bit. The screen was driven by a standard Windows XP personal computer. The experiment was programmed in E-Prime 2.0 Professional, and logged responses that were entered by means of a standard PS/2 keyboard and mouse.
As shown in Fig. 1 , a white background (157 cd/m2) was maintained throughout the experiment. Stimuli consisted of colored squares of 10 by 10 pixels, centered in an invisible 20 by 20 field. These fields were arranged in a grid of 5 by 5 positions (25 total), which itself was centered on the screen. On each trial, one of these positions remained empty. The others were filled such that on each of the two successive stimulus displays, 12 squares appeared in the one color, with the squares in the other display having the second color. The order of these colors was randomly drawn, but equally distributed. The same logic was applied to the contrast of the squares in either display, which was either low or high. Thus, a high contrast stimulus in the one color would be followed by a low contrast stimulus in the other color, or vice versa. The four possible colors were high contrast red (RGB 213, 0, 0; 23 cd/m2), low contrast red (RGB 255, 159, 159;  . On the response screen in the temporal order judgment task, a brief text in black 18 point bold Courier New font prompted participants to enter which color had come first, using the z or c key for either color, or the x key if they were unsure. On the response screen in the temporal integration task, a full grid of black outlined squares appeared. Participants could use the mouse to click where no colored square had previously appeared.
Procedure
There were 1152 experimental trials in the experiment, divided across the two tasks in two successive blocks of 576 trials each. The order of blocks was counterbalanced between participants, and each block was preceded by 24 practice trials that were discarded prior to analysis. Each task block was further subdivided in 6 trial blocks, after which a summary of performance was given, and at which point participant could take a short break. Participants could initiate a new block by pressing the right mouse button, but within each trial block the trials continued without interruption. Good performance was rewarded such that a correct answer in the integration task yielded 10 points, while an incorrect or missing answer subtracted 5. In the temporal order judgment task a correct answer yielded 5 points, an incorrect answer cost 10 points, and participants had a third option: By indicating that they were unsure of the temporal order, a loss of points could be avoided (but nothing could be gained either). After the experiment, the count was settled such that €1 was paid per 500 points earned.
Each trial started with a blank screen that lasted 600-1200 ms (600 + a ⁄ 30 ms, where a was randomly varied between 0 and 20). The first stimulus display (S1) followed, with a duration of 30 or 70 ms, depending on the experimental condition. After a brief interstimulus interval of 10 ms, the second stimulus display (S2) followed in turn, lasting 10, 20, or 30 ms, again dependent on the condition. The response screen then appeared after a blank interval of 600 ms, and terminated upon user input, or when 1200 ms had passed by.
The design featured three variables that were analyzed by means of repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The first variable was Contrast, with two levels (S1 high & S2 low or S1 low & S2 high). The second two-level variable was SOA (40 or 80 ms; S1 duration + 10 ms fixed ISI duration). The third variable was S2 duration, which had three levels (10, 20, or 30 ms). The full design thus comprised 12 cells (2 Â 2 Â 3). Analyses were performed separately for integration and order judgment tasks, and frequencies computed relative to all trials in the respective tasks. When a significant test of sphericity occurred, degrees of freedom were adjusted with the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction. Temporal order judgments were given on the basis of which color was perceived first. A trial in which high contrast blue stimuli preceded low contrast red stimuli is shown. Color is depicted by stripe patterns (vertical stripes represent blue and horizontal stripes represent red), and contrast by stripe thickness; solid color fills were used in the actual experiment. Order of color and contrast were distributed evenly and randomly drawn. In Experiment 1, S1 was shown for 30 or 70 ms, while in Experiment 2, S1 appeared for 10, 20, or 30 ms. In Experiment 1, the ISI was fixed at 10 ms, while in Experiment 2 it varied with S1 duration, so that SOA between S1 and S2 came to either 40 or 80 ms in both experiments.
Results
Temporal integration
The top panel of Fig. 2 shows the percentage of trials in which integration succeeded. Integrations were affected by main effects of SOA, F(1, 18) = 67.72, MSE = 0.02, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.79, and S2 duration, F(2, 36) = 17.71, MSE = 0.009, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.5, but not Contrast, F(1, 18) = 3.81, MSE = 0.009, p < 0.07, g 2 p = 0.18, which was only marginally reliable. At 40 ms SOA, integration frequency averaged 60.4%, compared to 44.9% at 80 ms. Increasing S2 duration also reduced integration frequency, but this was only evident for the 30 ms duration, which averaged 47.4%, compared to 54.1% for 10 ms, and 56.4% for 20 ms. The trend for stimulus contrast was that there seemed to be more integration when S1 was high contrast and S2 was low contrast (53.8%) than when this was reversed (51.4%).
The observed main effects were further modulated by two-way interactions. Contrast interacted with both SOA and S2 duration, F(1, 18) = 17.51, MSE = 0.006, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.49, and F(1, 23) = 34.87, MSE = 0.013, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.66, respectively. High contrast at S1 facilitated integration at 40 ms SOA (by 6.6%), but not at 80 ms SOA (À1.8%). Differential contrast effects were even more pronounced for different S2 durations. At 10 ms S2 duration, high contrast at S1 (and low contrast at S2) reduced integration frequency by 11.6%. By contrast, facilitation of 7.1% at 20 ms S2 duration and 11.7% at 30 ms S2 duration was found. Furthermore, SOA and S2 duration interacted, F(2, 36) = 3.93, MSE = 0.005, p < 0.05, g 2 p = 0.18. Integration dropped more steeply from 40 to 80 ms SOA when S2 duration was 10 ms (À19.2%), than when it was 20 ms (À14.3%) or 30 ms (À13%). Finally, the three-way term was not reliable (F < 1).
Temporal order judgments (accuracy)
The accuracy of temporal order judgments is shown in the middle panel of Fig. 2 . Accuracy was affected by main effects of Contrast, F(1, 18) = 5.15, MSE = 0.177, p < 0.05, g 2 p = 0.22, and SOA, F(1, 18) = 50.43, MSE = 0.071, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.74, while S2 duration did not have an effect (F < 1.8). High contrast at S1 improved temporal order judgments (52.3%), compared to low contrast at S1 (39.6%). Short SOA resulted in lower accuracy (33.4%) than long SOA (58.5%).
No two-way interactions with SOA were reliable (F's < 2.5), but Contrast and S2 duration did interact, F(2, 36) = 8.22,
At 10 ms S2 duration, high contrast more strongly facilitated order judgments (by 19%) than at 20 ms (8.7%) or 30 ms (10.3%). The three way interaction was only marginally reliable, F(1, 27) = 3.34, MSE = 0.009, p < 0.06, g 2 p = 0.16. It seemed to reflect that the effect of contrast diminished slightly between 40 and 80 ms SOA, at a 10 ms duration of S2 (from 20.4% to 17.6% difference between S1 high and low contrast), while it increased at 20 ms S2 duration (from 6.7% to 10.6% difference) and at 30 ms S2 duration (from 4.8% to 15.8% difference).
Temporal order judgments (uncertainty)
The bottom panel of Fig. 2 shows the percentage of trials in which participants indicated not to know the temporal order of the stimuli. As in the analysis of temporal integration, Contrast only had a marginal main effect, F(1, 18) = 3.53, MSE = 0.061, p < 0.08, g 2 p = 0.16, reflecting a trend towards increased uncertainty (38.3%) when S1 was low contrast (and S2 was high contrast), compared to the reverse (32.2%). There were reliable effects of SOA, F(1, 18) = 27.01, MSE = 0.068, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.6, and S2 duration, F(1, 24) = 6.13, MSE = 0.01, p < 0.05, g 2 p = 0.25. Longer stimulus duration decreased uncertainty; for SOA from 44.3% at 40 ms to 26.3% at 80 ms, and for S2 duration from 37.1% at 10 ms, to 35.9% at 20 ms, and 32.7% at 30 ms.
Contrast interacted with SOA, F(1, 18) = 11.2, MSE = 0.013, p < 0.005, g 2 p = 0.38, as well as with S2 duration, F(2, 36) = 19.98, MSE = 0.012, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.53. The first interaction indicated that the contrast effect was more pronounced at 80 ms SOA (11.2% difference) than at 40 ms (1.1% difference). The second interaction showed that the shortest S2 duration of 10 ms resulted in the strongest contrast effect (18.7% difference), while it was virtually absent at 20 ms (2.3% difference) and at 30 ms (-2.7% difference; reflecting a nominal benefit for high contrast at S1). SOA and S2 duration also interacted, F(2, 27) = 9.53, MSE = 0.007, p < 0.005, g 2 p = 0.35. This interaction reflected that the S2 duration effect of decreased uncertainty with longer duration was only evident at short SOA. At 40 ms SOA, uncertainty decreased with increasing S2 duration; from 48.5% at 10 ms, to 45.5% at 20 ms, and to 38.9% at 30 ms. At 80 ms SOA, this did not seem to occur, with uncertain responses of 25.8%, 26.4%, and 26.6%, at 10, 20, and 30 ms S2 duration, respectively. Finally, the three way interaction was also reliable, F(1, 24) = 6.28, MSE = 0.013, p < 0.05, g 2 p = 0.26. Further modulating the patterns detailed above, the three-way interaction revealed that the contrast effect was very consistent for both SOAs, when S2 duration was 10 ms (18.5% at 40 ms and 18.9% difference at 80 ms SOA). By contrast, at 20 ms S2 duration, the contrast effect seemed different between 40 and 80 ms SOA (À2.1% and 6.6% difference, respectively). This was even more so at 30 ms S2 duration, with À13.2% difference at 40 ms SOA, and 8% difference at 80 ms.
Discussion
In line with expectations, temporal integration frequency as well order judgments showed some clear common effects. Among these were the straightforward changes brought about by SOA: Shorter SOA increased integration and uncertainty with regard to temporal order, and decreased the accuracy of order judgments. S2 duration had comparable effect on temporal integration and temporal order uncertainty, although the effect on the former was mostly limited to the condition in which S2 was 30 ms. Furthermore, there was no overall S2 duration effect on temporal order judgment accuracy.
Stimulus contrast, however, produced some unexpected outcomes, even though the observed trends seemed straightforward initially. Overall, there was a trend indicating that a high contrast S1 followed by a low contrast S2 increased integration, and there was reliable evidence for a decrease in the number of uncertain responses. Yet, contrary to what might be expected, high contrast at S1 was also associated with a trend towards increased temporal order accuracy. Stimulus contrast furthermore proved to depend on the duration of the shorter stimulus (i.e., S2) quite markedly. At 10 ms S2 duration, contrary to the overall trend in the present data described above, integration frequency and TOJ uncertainty were lower when S1 was high contrast, compared to when it was low contrast, while temporal order judgment accuracy was higher. However, at 20 and 30 ms S2 duration, both integration and temporal order accuracy were higher when S1 was high contrast; contrary to the reciprocal relationship between these measures that was observed at 10 ms S2 duration. Furthermore, temporal order uncertainty no longer clearly differed.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 indicated that temporal integration and temporal order judgments can vary in different ways, depending on the interplay between stimulus contrast and duration. These findings support the notion that even when the stimulus material is identical, the integration and order judgment task may not tap fully identical cognitive processes, at least for the presentation conditions currently tested. It is similarly conceivable that different modes of attention (endogenous or exogenous) were being engaged. However, the discrepancy between tasks seemed to rest primarily with the accuracy of order judgments. The frequency of uncertain responses in the TOJ task showed a (mirrored) pattern that was quite similar to that of correct integrations, showing a correlation between the means of r = 0.875. This suggests that . Separate lines, indicated by black and white symbol fills, correspond to different contrast conditions. Black symbols denote a high contrast S1 followed by a low contrast S2, and white denotes the reverse. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean.
uncertainty with regard to order may thus rely more on sensory signals that also enable temporal integration, while the judgment that is otherwise made may include other, more top-down driven aspects.
Experiment 2
Although having a variable and relatively long duration of the first stimulus display is common in temporal integration tasks, it is conceivable that the manipulations in Experiment 1 were specifically driven by the inequality in stimulus strength between the first and second stimulus display. The relatively long duration of the first stimulus presumably made it much more prominent than the second stimulus, if only because it is known that for near-threshold stimuli, perceived brightness and duration are related (Bloch, 1885) . To investigate whether the relative strength of the first stimulus in Experiment 1 might have played a role in the outcomes, in Experiment 2 the duration of that stimulus was reduced so that it always matched the second stimulus, thereby equalizing their comparative strength.
3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-five new participants (21 female) took part in the experiment. Following the same criterion as in Experiment 1, the data of 6 participants (5 female) were excluded. Mean age was 20.3 years (range 18-28 years) in the final sample.
Apparatus and stimuli
The experimental setup was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Procedure and design
The procedure and design were similarly unchanged, with the exception of S1 duration. Rather than 30 or 70 ms, S1 duration was either 10, 20, or 30 ms, equal to the duration of S2 on the same trial. SOA remained the variable of interest, and was preserved at either 40 or 80 ms, being equal to S1 duration + ISI. Thus, when S1 was 10 ms, the ISI was either 30 or 70 ms, when S1 was 20 ms, the ISI was either 20 or 60 ms, and when S1 was 30 ms, the ISI was either 10 or 50 ms.
Results
Temporal integration
The top panel of Fig. 3 shows the frequency of integration. There were significant effects of Contrast, F(1, 18) = 56.47, MSE = 0.012, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.76, as well as SOA, F(1, 18) = 79.03, MSE = 0.068, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.81, while S2 duration was far from reliable (F < 1). A high contrast S1, followed by a low contrast S2, averaged 36.3% integration, compared to 25.5% for the reverse contrast. Short SOA averaged 46.3% integration, compared to 15.5% for long SOA.
Contrast and SOA interacted as well, F(1, 18) = 10.79, MSE = 0.011, p < 0.005, g 2 p = 0.38, indicating that the contrast effect was bigger at short SOA (15.3% difference), compared to long SOA (6.4% difference). Contrast had a marginal interaction with S2 duration, F(2, 36) = 2.47, MSE = 0.003, p < 0.1, g 2 p = 0.12, showing a weak trend towards a bigger contrast effect with longer S2 duration (9.1% difference at 10 ms, 10.7% at 20 ms, and 12.8% at 30 ms). The two-way interaction between SOA and S2 duration was reliable, F(2, 36) = 6.93, MSE = 0.004, p < 0.005, g 2 p = 0.28. This effect also seemed relatively subtle, with a slightly weaker SOA effect for 10 ms S2 duration (26.4% difference) than for 20 ms (32.9% difference) and 30 ms (33.1% difference). The three-way interaction was not significant (F < 1).
Temporal order judgments (accuracy)
The accuracy of temporal order judgments is shown in the middle panel of . High contrast at S1 resulted in lower accuracy (43.5%) than high contrast at S2 (52.5%). Short SOA strongly reduced accuracy, averaging 24.3%, compared to 71.7% at long SOA. Finally, longer S2 duration facilitated order judgments, from 40.6% at 10 ms, to 50.4% at 20 ms, and 53% at 30 ms.
Further modulations were caused by two-way interactions. Contrast interacted with SOA, F(1, 18) = 6.38, MSE = 0.014, p < 0.05, g 2 p = 0.26, showing that the contrast effect was stronger at short SOA (13% vs. 5.1% difference). There was a further marginal interaction involving S2 duration, F(1, 26) = 3.39, MSE = 0.007, p < 0.07, g 2 p = 0.16, hinting at a trend towards a bigger contrast effect at the longest S2 duration of 30 ms (12% difference), compared to 10 and 20 ms (6.3% and 8.9% difference, respectively). The last two-way interaction of SOA with S2 duration was also reliable, F(1, 26) = 7.89, MSE = 0.009, p < 0.005, g 2 p = 0.31. The increase in accuracy from short to long SOA seemed to be weaker when S2 duration was 10 ms (41.8% increase) than when it was 20 ms (49% increase), or 30 ms (51.4% increase). Finally, the three-way interaction was also reliable, F(2, 36) = 4.28, MSE = 0.004, p < 0.05, g 2 p = 0.19. This interaction seemed to point towards a stronger contrast effect at short SOA when S2 duration was longer: The difference came to 19% at 30 ms, compared to 12.5% difference at 20 ms and 7.5% difference at 10 ms.
Temporal order judgments (uncertainty)
The frequency of uncertain responses is shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 3 . These responses were affected by Contrast, F
(1, 18) = 38.73, MSE = 0.017, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.68, showing an overall increase in uncertainty when a high contrast S1 and a low contrast S2 were presented (43.7%), compared to the reversed contrast (33.1%). SOA also had a strong effect, F(1, 18) = 151.63, MSE = 0.086, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.89, with more uncertainty occurring when SOA was short than when it was long (62.3% vs. 14.5%). The main effect of S2 duration was also reliable, F(1, 22) = 21.52, MSE = 0.019, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.55. Uncertainty was highest at 10 ms S2 duration (44.9%), compared to the averages at 20 ms (35.9%) and 30 ms (34.4%).
Contrast further interacted with SOA, F(1, 18) = 5.16, MSE = 0.014, p < 0.05, g 2 p = 0.22, showing that the contrast effect was larger at 40 ms SOA (14.2% difference) than at 80 ms (7.1% difference). Contrast and S2 duration only had a marginal interaction effect, F(2, 36) = 2.92, MSE = 0.003, p < 0.07, g 2 p = 0.14, showing that the contrast effect tended to be slightly larger for longer S2 durations; from 12.8% difference at 30 ms to 10.5% difference at 20 ms, and 8.6% difference at 10 ms. The interaction between SOA and S2 duration was also marginal, F(1, 25) = 3.78, MSE = 0.009, p < 0.06, g 2 p = 0.17. Uncertainty seemed to decrease slightly less from long to short SOA when S2 duration was 10 ms (43.8% decrease) than when it was 20 ms (49% decrease) or 10 ms (50.5% decrease). The three-way interaction was not significant (F < 1).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 were straightforward: Integration was facilitated by a high contrast S1 and a low contrast S2, while temporal order judgments were less accurate in this condition. Uncertainty with regard to order again followed the opposite pattern; with more uncertainty resulting from the high contrast S2 condition. There was evidence from all three response measures that contrast effects were more pronounced when SOA was short. Since the temporal intrusion is obviously higher at short SOA, these effects confirm that contrast does not generically affect the perception of stimuli, but specifically affects the perceptual process of temporal integration and/or separation. There were furthermore several marginal trends suggesting that longer S2 duration might also enhance contrast effects, to a more limited degree. These trends might have been observed since S2 was not followed by a mask, providing more opportunity for S2 (and its contrast) to leave an impression. Clearly, the results of Experiment 2 showed some notable discrepancies with those of Experiment 1. First among these was the divergence at 10 ms S2 duration in Experiment 1, where low contrast at S1 actually facilitated performance, contrary to the pattern observed anywhere else. A mixed between-experiments analysis of integration accuracy as a function of contrast and S2 duration confirmed this discrepancy, in that the three-way term was reliable, F(2, 60) = 27.3, MSE = 0.003, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.43. A similar pattern was observed for uncertainty in the temporal order judgment task, where 10 ms S2 duration in Experiment 1 also produced an advantage of low contrast at S1, F(2, 60) = 15.26, MSE = 0.005, p < 0.001, g 2 p = 0.3. Temporal order accuracy furthermore showed a completely reversed pattern between experiments. While high contrast at S1 facilitated order judgments in Experiment 1, it impaired these judgments in Experiment 2, as confirmed by a reliable interaction between Experiment and Contrast, F(1, 36) = 10.41, MSE = 0.049, p < 0.005, g 2 p = 0.22. These findings highlight that contrast effects can vary substantially across different stimulus durations, as well as between temporal integration and order judgment tasks. This may implicate different brain mechanisms; an issue which is further discussed in the following section. Similar to Experiment 1, however, temporal integration accuracy and TOJ uncertainty nevertheless strongly correlated in Experiment 2 (r = 0.973), implicating that these were again similarly affected by stimulus contrast and duration.
General discussion
Temporal integration rate and order uncertainty varied similarly as a function of stimulus contrast and duration in both experiments, suggesting that these perceptual states may be similarly driven by sensory information. Temporal integration rate and order judgment accuracy also showed similar patterns in several of the presently tested conditions, yet there were also notable exceptions, in which wholly opposite effects were observed. In the following, a tentative account for the findings will be presented. To start with the most straightforward outcome: The results of Experiment 2 consistently showed that a high contrast S1 followed by a low contrast S2 resulted in more temporal confusion. Integration as well as uncertain temporal order responses were higher, while order accuracy was lower, in comparison with the reversed contrast. These results follow the same trend that has been observed for stimulus intensity in integration tasks (e.g., Eriksen & Collins, 1968; Kinnucan & Friden, 1981) , and fit with previous observations that a low contrast stimulus tends to be perceived as having occurred earlier in time (Bachmann et al., 2004) .
This outcome seems compatible with the idea that low stimulus contrast evokes less brain activity than high contrast (e.g., Sclar & Freeman, 1982) , based on which a conceptual model of temporal perception can be specified. In Panel A of Fig. 4 , using as few additional assumptions as possible, resultant neural activity distributions are visualized as a function of time for each of the contrast conditions. Neural activity is plotted in arbitrary units, as the model is principally neutral with regard to the nature of such activity (e.g., firing rate or phase locking). Activity in the model is thought to have an exponential property, such that activity accelerates towards peak activity levels, but also drops back to baseline (the horizontal axis) more readily. This assumption of non-linear scaling is motivated by the idea that it would help efficient representation (Baddeley et al., 1997) , but is not essential for the model to function.
Although it is not essential for the model either, it is assumed that a certain degree of activity is needed for the brain to become perceptually aware of a stimulus; this is visualized by means of a threshold level (t). The idea of a (dynamic) threshold is shared with the influential Global Neuronal Workspace model developed by Dehaene and Changeux (2011) and Dehaene, Sergent, and Changeux (2003) . In this model, once activity passed the threshold, the global workspace is ''ignited" and self-amplifying recurrent activity occurs, constituting conscious awareness. The current model is nevertheless principally agnostic with regard to the question of whether awareness should involve wide-spread (non-specific) recurrent activity across brain regions, or whether more local activity would suffice (cf. Bachmann, 2007; Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Lamme, 2006) . It is furthermore reasonable to assume some time is needed before the threshold is reached, which is typically estimated to be around 100 ms (e.g., Wu, Busch, Fabre-Thorpe, & VanRullen, 2009) .
Critically, the model couples a degree of persistence with the contrast-induced difference in the magnitude of activity. The idea that the neural signal lingers after stimulus offset, and that it has perceptual consequences, is supported by classic behavioral experiments and remains uncontested (e.g., Hogben & Di Lollo, 1974; Sperling, 1960) . Persistence is modeled by having neural activity subside more slowly than it rises. This produces the dynamics visualized in Panel A of Fig. 4 (by the solid lines; the dotted lines reflect an additional assumption further detailed below). When a high contrast stimulus is followed by a low contrast stimulus (solid lines, top plot), it differs in three ways from when a low contrast S1 is followed by a high contrast S2 (solid lines, bottom plot): The activity peaks are closer together, the interval in-between during which neither stimulus is above threshold is shorter, and there is more overlap between the activity distributions of the stimulus pair. These differences all point towards the same perceptual outcome, namely that the perceived temporal separation between the stimuli is lower when a high contrast S1 is followed by a low contrast S2, as expressed in increased integration rates, increased TOJ uncertainty, and reduced TOJ accuracy. It may be noted here that previously advanced formal models of persistence would presumably generate similar predictions (Dixon & Di Lollo, 1994; Loftus & Irwin, 1998 ).
The present model not only shows which assumptions are necessary to produce the observed behavior, but also highlights at least one other candidate assumption that would actually be counterproductive, namely that brain activity associated with low contrast not only produces lower peak amplitude, but also takes longer to build than for high contrast stimuli. Panel B of Fig. 4 shows the resultant distributions. Including this assumption would appear to be justified on the basis of previous findings. For instance, Alpern (1954; see also Roufs, 1963) demonstrated that observers had more difficulty judging temporal order with lower stimulus intensity, and Kelly (1961) showed that flicker sensitivity increased when luminance was higher, suggesting that the visual system 'speeds up'. A similar result was obtained for stimulus contrast in both flicker and motion tasks (Stromeyer & Martini, 2003) .
However, when this assumption is added to the model, it only counteracts the observed behavior. As shown in Panel B of Fig. 4 (solid lines) , when a high contrast S1 is followed by a low contrast S2, S2 would have reached threshold relatively late, while the high contrast S1 would not have been delayed (top plot). In this case, maximal temporal separation should have been observed, resulting in more accurate and less uncertain TOJ, and less integration, and the reverse when a low contrast S1 is followed by a high contrast S2 (bottom plot). Neither of these predictions were confirmed by the present data, suggest- Fig. 4 . Conceptualization of the brain activity over time in relevant cortical areas, as a function of contrast condition. Panel A depicts a scenario in which contrast only modulates peak amplitude, while in Panel B the rise time is also modulated by contrast. Activity distributions plotted with dotted lines illustrate how rise time might be affected specifically by shorter S2 duration when S1 duration is relatively long. In both panels, the top plot shows the condition in which the high contrast stimulus (black symbols) precedes the low contrast stimulus (grey symbols), and the bottom plot shows the reverse. Filled circles denote stimulus onset, open circles and associated drop lines flag the peak of the respective activity distributions. The dashed horizontal line shows an arbitrary threshold value (t), beyond which the stimulus may enter awareness.
ing that task performance did not depend on such latency differences. Thus, these differences are best omitted from the model if it is to account for temporal integration and order judgment as a function of relative stimulus contrast.
Relationship to brain electrophysiology
There is some prior evidence from event-related potential (ERP) studies of temporal integration that supports the model dynamics advocated here. Akyürek et al. (2010; Akyürek & Meijerink, 2012 ) measured component amplitude during both early (N1, N2) and late (P3) phases of the ERP during temporal integration in a typical MET, similar to the current paradigm. In their task, SOA was determined mainly by S1 duration, as in Experiment 1 of the present paper. The authors found that increased component amplitude across N1, N2, and P3 was associated with successful integration of the two successive displays. By contrast, there was no indication that the latency of any of these components changed systematically. If component amplitude can be related to representation strength (assumption 1), this pattern of results would match the predictions of the model depicted in Fig. 4 , provided that the ERP was driven mainly by the (onset of the) first stimulus (assumption 2). Some evidence for both assumptions may be found in the Appendix Figure published by Akyürek and Meijerink (2012) , the relevant panel of which is reproduced here as Fig. 5 . Here, the ERPs of different S1 duration conditions of their MET were overlaid (40, 70, and 100 ms, with 10 ms ISI). The figure firstly shows that increased component amplitude was elicited by the longer-lasting (stronger) S1s, at least as far as the earlier components are concerned. Secondly, it is apparent from this figure also that there was no consistent time-shift in the ERP, despite the varying SOA between the contrasted conditions. These findings held not only when the participants were doing an actual integration task, but also for another experimental condition in which no temporal integration, but only singleton detection was required, with identical stimulus timing (not shown). At a conceptual level, the ERP observed in this MET thus aligns well with the neural activation dynamics predicted by the current model. Similar direct ERP evidence for TOJ tasks under conditions comparable to those in the MET paradigm is not yet available. Such evidence would provide a further validation check of the assumptions underlying the present model. Eventually, a direct test of the effects of stimulus duration and relative contrast on the ERP in these tasks will be essential to further support theorizing on the underlying neural dynamics. Further research is thus clearly needed here. Some relevant results are nevertheless available from a previous ERP study of a different TOJ task in which attention was also modulated (McDonald, Teder-Sälejärvi, Di Russo, & Hillyard, 2005 ). An amplitude change, spanning the P1, N1, and P2 components, was also implicated in this study. Stimulus and task differences may affect the components that are modulated, but the activity dynamics were in line with the current model, even though other authors have additionally observed component latency shifts in a bimodal TOJ task (Vibell, Klinge, Zampini, Spence, & Nobre, 2007) .
Differences between tasks
Can the model depicted in Panel A of Fig. 4 be further modified to account for the deviant results obtained in Experiment 1? In this experiment, SOA was directly determined by S1 duration, as is common in temporal integration tasks (e.g., Akyürek et al., 2010; Di Lollo, 1977 . Even though the present study used negative contrast (i.e., relatively dark stimuli on a white background), it seems likely that the impression made by the stimuli increases in strength as duration increases (cf. Bloch's Law for perceived brightness; Bloch, 1885) . Previous research furthermore suggests that the relatively long duration of S1 may have made its offset in particular more noticeable (Wilson, 1983) . Two notable observations resulted in the present study. First, at 10 ms S2 duration, a pattern of performance was observed that was opposite to that found in all conditions of Experiment 2. A low contrast S1 followed by a high contrast S2 facilitated integration, decreased the accuracy of order judgments, and increased TOJ uncertainty, compared to the reverse contrast condition. Second, the accuracy of order judgments at 20 and 30 ms S2 duration remained higher for a high contrast S1 followed by a low contrast S2 than for the reverse contrast condition, even though integration performance reverted to match Experiment 2 at those S2 durations. In the following, possible explanations for these discrepant results will be offered, interpreting the results within the framework of the model. Primarily, to account for the deviance in temporal integration frequency and order judgments in the 10 ms S2 condition of Experiment 1, an additional assumption is required to alter the model dynamics. This assumption is that stimulus contrast and duration interact in some cases, such that a particularly weak stimulus not only attains lower peak activity, but also takes longer to get there. This may (only) happen in the most extreme condition currently tested in Experiment 1, when a brief (10 ms), low contrast S2 is preceded by a strong, and relatively long-lasting S1. The hypothesized role for S1 here is justified because the combination of its contrast and duration is likely to intensify forward masking of S2 (cf. Kirschfeld & Kammer, 2000) . It may also cause S1 to be perceived as if it occurred later, due to its delayed offset (Jaśkowski, 1991) , increasing the ambiguity of the stimulus sequence. In line with the above, it must also be assumed that when S1 has low contrast, and S2 has high contrast, the hypothesized slowing of S2-related activity does not, or only to a much lesser extent, occur.
The resultant distributions are visualized with the dotted lines in Panel A of Fig. 4 . Because the low contrast S2 (top plot) suffers more from short duration than the high contrast S2 (bottom plot), it gets delayed to the point where the temporal separation perceived between the stimuli is greater in the former case than in the latter. This would cause the observed reversal of performance seen at 10 ms S2 duration in Experiment 1. Note that applying the same transformations on the distributions in Panel B, which assume task performance should reflect a 'main effect' of contrast on activity rise time, does not as easily produce a reversal in outcomes, again suggesting that this assumption is less likely to be correct. Here, even though the slowing of a low contrast S2 might be less (because of the already-present slowing for low contrast stimuli), this would only reinforce the temporal distinctiveness advantage of the condition in which a high contrast S1 precedes it (top plot). The comparatively small delay that might occur for a high contrast S2 would be hard-pressed to overcome the temporal proximity caused by the slow rise of the low contrast S1 that precedes it (bottom plot).
With regard to the observed facilitation of temporal order judgment accuracy in all S2 duration conditions when it followed a high contrast S1 in Experiment 1, the most parsimonious account appears to assume that when confronted with a relatively long S1 the observers relied on a different signal to judge order. Since the activity associated with S1 is expected to be high overall, the total area of its activity distribution above the detection threshold may also become quite large. This may demarcate the stimulus from the weaker S2 to such an extent that it is consequently seen (correctly) as having come first. Such an effect is reminiscent of prior entry (Spence & Parise, 2010; Titchener, 1908) , an attention-related latency illusion in which stronger stimuli are seen as having occurred earlier in time (though see Jaśkowski, 1996 , for an opposing view on prior entry in TOJ).
It seems conceivable that while order judgments may normally rely on perceived temporal separation, it may be overruled by the strong discrepancy in stimulus (offset) clarity, as elicited by the relatively long duration of S1 in Experiment 1. The decision level that is needed to judge order, beyond a state of mere uncertainty, may provide the opportunity to take such additional evidence into account. This idea fits with previous evidence against an account of TOJ performance on the basis of perceptual latency (Ulrich, 1987) , and a similar proposal that was fielded by McDonald et al. (2005) , who studied attentional biases in temporal order judgments. The authors observed attentional amplitude enhancement over visual cortex, in the absence of latency change, suggesting that (attentional modulation of) TOJ in their task relied on signal strength. A similar reliance may have occurred in the present study.
It has indeed been suggested previously that attentional involvement in temporal order judgment may primarily affect decision mechanisms (Aghdaee, Battelli, & Assad, 2014) . Thus, if the relatively long duration of S1 caused differential involvement of exogenous and endogenous modes of attention (cf. Lawrence & Klein, 2013) , that might be expected to result in a change at the decision level, thereby causing TOJ accuracy to deviate from the other measures. In view of previous evidence implicating parietal cortex in perceiving stimulus on-/offset and temporal order (Battelli, Cavanagh, Martini, & Barton, 2003; Davis, Christie, & Rorden, 2009) , it might be a fruitful avenue for further neurophysiological research to assess the relative involvement of this area as a function of stimulus contrast and duration in both order and integration tasks, which might provide converging evidence for differential functional involvement.
Taken together, not one single mechanism based on either perceived stimulus strength or latency seems able to account for all aspects of the present results. Behavior in trials in which a TOJ decision was made in particular seems to involve processing beyond what underlies both temporal integration and the experience of order uncertainty. A similar conclusion was reached by Di Lollo, von Mühlenen, Enns, and Bridgeman (2004) , based on an examination of metacontrast masking as a function of target-mask ($S1-S2) SOA and mask duration. These authors obtained evidence that different mechanisms might underlie the effects on task performance caused by these two factors. Although the tasks in the present study were different, and although the duration of S1, rather than S2, seemed the critical variable in these tasks, the outcomes do seem to converge on the idea that not all aspects of the perception of brief, successive stimuli follow uniform rules. S1 40 ms S1 70 ms S1 100 ms Fig. 5 . The event-related potential (in lV) in a missing element task that was very similar to the presently used paradigm, recorded at electrode Pz, and time-locked to the onset of the first stimulus at time zero. Separate lines reflect 30, 70, and 100 ms duration of the first stimulus. The inter-stimulus interval and S2 duration were constant at 10 ms. Reproduced from Akyürek and Meijerink (2012) .
As previously alluded to, the current results suggest that this non-uniformity might be attributed to the need for more (conscious) evidence weighing to reach a perceptual decision (beyond being uncertain about order) in the TOJ task than in the integration task, which might imply reliance on recurrent pathways in the brain, and possibly increased top-down control in the former task. This could be accounted for in models of perceptual awareness through interactions between stimulus-specific and top-down activations, as previously proposed by Bachmann (1997) , which might specifically trigger deviations in some cases, such as when a relatively long S1 is presented.
Conclusions
Although temporal integration and temporal order judgments were presently found to change consistently with relative stimulus contrast in most conditions of the present study, this was clearly less the case when the duration of the first stimulus was relatively long. Thus it must be concluded that when it comes to perceiving simultaneity and episodic unity, relative stimulus contrast interacts with stimulus duration, such that at a given contrast level facilitation as well impedance can result. The present results also underscore that in the perception of rapid successive stimuli, seeing integrated percepts and temporal order do not always perfectly align, resulting in a 'two-sided' perceptual experience: It seems that sometimes perceived stimulus strength can be used, possibly post hoc, to infer order between a pair of stimuli that make an integrated impression.
